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WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS
WILLIAM J. BOWE*
EXECUTION OF WILLS
Formalities. The statutory formalities required for the execution of
wills are too frequently brushed aside as trivia. The lawyer, super-
vising the ceremony of execution, and the testator, as the chief actor,
may have feelings of embarrassed self-consciousness in complying with
the required minutiae. But the importance of staging a routine cere-
mony, however silly it may seem at the moment, cannot be over-
estimated. Law students ought to be told and practitioners reminded
to adopt the practice, once the testator and witnesses are assembled,
of closing the door, drawing the shades, cutting off the telephone and
advising all present that no one may leave the room for the next five
minutes. Then explain that they are about to participate in a brief
one-act play and that each is to observe what the others do. The testa-
tor should sign the document. Then ask him, "What is this document?"
Make him answer, "My will." Next question: "Is that your signature?"
Wait for his answer. "Do you wish these persons to act as witnesses?"
And so forth. The lawyer who always follows this routine may so
testify years later, when he has forgotten all about the execution of
the particular will in question.'
The Tennessee statutes require that (1) the testator shall signify
to the witnesses that the instrument is his will; (2) the testator shall
sign himself or acknowledge his signature already made; and (3) the
witnesses (at least two) must sign (a) in the presence of the testator
and (b) in the presence of each other.
2
In Lawrence v. Lawrence,3 one of the attesting witnesses had died.
On direct examination, in response to the question, "Did Mrs. Law-
rence acknowledge this instrument as her will?" the other testified,
"Yes." But on cross-examination she was asked: "Did you know what
it was you were signing?" Answer: "I don't remember. I don't think
I did." The court then asked if anyone told her what it was. Answer:
"I don't remember." And finally she said: "No, I didn't know it was
a will." Probate was refused; an essential requisite of execution was
lacking.
In Miller v. Thrasher,4 an unsuccessful attempt was made to break
* Professor Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar; author,
Tax Planning for Estates (1952).
1. 1 WIGmoRE, EvIDENcE § 92 (3d ed. 1940).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8098.1-8098.9 (Williams Supp. 1952). At his direction
and in his presence someone else may sign his name for him.
3. 250 S.W.2d 781 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1951).
4. 251 S.W.2d 446 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
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a will on the grounds (1) that the testator had not acknowledged the
instrument to be his will and (2) that the witnesses had not signed
in the presence of each other. In that case, one Morgan, who had pre-
pared the will, read it to the witnesses in the presence of the testator.
The testator stood mute, but the Court very properly held that an-
other might act for him and that his silence under all the circum-
stances satisfied the requirement that he signify the instrument to be
his will. On the other point, there was a conflict in the testimony.
Nonattesting witnesses, present at the time, testified that the attesting
witnesses each signed in the presence of the other. Evidence of due
execution is not confined to the testimony of attesting witnesses.
5
Joint Wills. A joint will is one in which the same paper is executed
by two or more persons as their respective wills. Most of the early
common law cases held joint wills invalid. 6 It was suggested that a
joint will was a single instrument not to become effective until the
death of the survivor and that it could not be said to be the will of the
first dying party, because it was not effective on his death. But there
is no reason why a joint will may not be regarded as the will of each
testator and probated twice, once on the death of each. This is the
modern, generally recognized view and the position taken by the Su-
preme Court in Buchanan v. Willis.
7
Insurance. While not strictly an execution problem, it may be noted
here that the proceeds of life insurance payable to the estate of the
testator do not pass pursuant to the terms of his will unless express
provision is so made. Code section 8456 provides that the proceeds of
insurance shall "enure to the benefit of the widow and children," and
it takes a formal express clause in the will to defeat this.8 The Court
had occasion to reaffirm this rule in Pope v. Alexander9 and in Crockett
v. Webb. 10
5. For an amusing case wherein it appeared that a horse knew more about
the formal requirements than did counsel, see Casson v. Dade, 1 Bro. C.C. 99,
28 Eng. Rep. 1010 (1781). T went to her attorney's office to execute the will.
"Being asthmatical and the office very hot, she retired to her carriage to exe-
cute the will, the witnesses attending her: after having seen the execution,
they returned into the office to attest it, and the carriage was accidentally put
back to the window of the office, through which it was sworn by a person in
the carriage, the testatrix might see what passed. . . ." The will was held duly
executed.
6. ATxmUSON, WILLS 174 (1937).
7. 255 S.W.2d 8 (Tenn. 1953).
8. It has been consistently held that this section of the Code in no wise
limits the authority of the husband to control policies of insurance upon his life
where they are payable to his estate; such insurance is property of the husband
and subject to his disposition either during his life or by will. American
Trust Co. v. Twinam, 187 Tenn. 570, 216 S.W.2d 314 (1948).
9. 250 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. 1952).
10. 257 S.W.2d 4 (Tenn. 1953). In the Pope case, the will failed to mention
the insurance, and the proceeds, even though payable to the estate, were held
to pass directly to the wife. In the Crockett case, the testator devised and be-
queathed "all of the rest and residue of my estate, real, personal and mixed,
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INTESTACY
Descent and Distribution. On the death of a husband, childless and
intestate, his wife is entitled to all his personalty" and a dower interest
in his real estate.12 Thus, if his estate consists solely of real estate, his
wife would be limited to a one-third interest therein for life; his
brothers and sisters would share two-thirds of the fee outright and
own the remaining one-third subject to his wife's life estate.13 But
let title to the real estate be in the deceased husband's wholly owned
corporation and his wife will be sole beneficiary of his property.
Should the form of ownership determine the recipients of an estate?
Are there any reasons having validity today why the distribution of
intestate property should turn on the distinction between* real and
personal property? The nature of wealth in the United States has
changed since the industrial revolution. Today, stocks and bonds
rather than real estate represent the bulk of individually owned invest-
ments, and the old rules seem especially unfair to wives.
In Hinton v. Carney,14 the arbitrary results of this antiquated distinc-
tion were illustrated in a much less dramatic case than arises when
a husband dies owning only real estate, but the problem was the same.
The decedent owned all of the stock in a corporation conducting the
business of a funeral home. He dictated its affairs, operating it as
though it were his individually owned property. His heirs were an
uncle and eight cousins. Under the Tennessee statute, an uncle is pre-
ferred over cousins, as to personalty, 5 but uncles and cousins share
equally in any real estate.16 The cousins argued that the decedent was
really the equitable owner of the real estate, title to which was vested
in the corporation. The Court, however, applied the traditional rule
that a corporation is a separate entity from its sole stockholder and
held that the stock in the corporation passed to the uncle. Isn't it time
that the Tennessee legislature amended the statute to provide that the
rules of intestate distribution should apply alike to real and personal
property? Most other states have taken this forward step.17 We may
not be particularly concerned about uncles and cousins, but why
including all life insurance payable to or collectible by my estate in trust" for
various beneficiaries. He was survived by his wife but no children. His wife
elected to take against the will and contended that, therefore, her interests
were not controlled in any way by the terms of that instrument. She claimed
the entire amount of the insurance proceeds under the statute. But the Court
held that the insurance fund, because of the express words in the will, became
a part of the estate, and that her rights were limited to one-third thereof.
11. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8389 (2) (Williams 1934).
12. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8351 (Williams 1934).
13. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8380 (2) (a) (Williams 1934).
14. 250 S.W.2d 364 (Tenn. 1952).
15. TEN. CODE ANN. § 8389 (5) (Williams 1934).
16. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8380 (2) (a) (Williams 1934). See Hinton v. Carney,
250 S.W.2d 364 (Tenn. 1952).
17. ATKINSON, WILLs 45 (1937).
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should a wife's intestate share depend on the investment medium her
husband selects or the legal form under which he chooses to manage
and operate his holdings?
Pretermitted Children. Our common law tradition has been one of
almost complete freedom of testation. The principal restrictive limita-
tation on the power to dispose of property at death as one wishes has
been the almost universal forced-share provision for the widow. Al-
most everywhere in the United States, the widow is given a share in
the personalty -frequently an amount equal to her intestate share,
sometimes less - of which she cannot be deprived by will.18 Children,
however, may be freely disinherited. 19 The child is protected only
against negligent oversight. In all states, there are statutes similar to
our own 20 that a child born after the execution of a will may take an
intestate share unless it appears that the omission was intentional.
The objective here is to protect against testamentary carelessness. Any
reference to children or provisions otherwise made for them will defeat
their rights under these statutes, since they are not designed to over-
ride the intention of a testator but to avoid an accidental dis-
inheritance.21
In Couch v. Couch,22 the decedent, the father of an illegitimate son,
had entered into a contract of adoption with the child's mother that he
would provide for his son, who was to bear his name, and "that said
child will inherit from my estate or estates, in whole or in part, as any
other son or child of [mine]."
The decedent's will, omitting any reference to his son, was executed
in 1926. The contract of adoption was entered into in 1929. His son
claimed as an adopted, pretermitted child, but the Court properly held
that, in the absence of a statutory adoption, he had no standing in
court as an adopted child. An earlier case had indicated, however,
that the benefits of this statute extended to legally adopted children.2
The problem of construing the contract was more difficult. While,
as the Court pointed out, the language, strictly read, gave the son only
the expectancy that any other child would have, it seems arguable that
something more than this was contemplated when the mother sur-
rendered the child on the execution of the contract. Was she merely
exposing the son to a likelihood of inheriting, or was the contract
intended to be a definite assurance of it? While the Court probably
18. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8358 (Williams 1934).
19. AT~isoN, WiLLs 91 et seq. (1937).
20. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8131 (Williams 1934) provides: "A child born after
the making of a will . . . not provided for nor disinherited, but only pre-
termitted, in such will, and not provided for by settlement made by the testator
in his lifetime, shall succeed to the same portion of the testator's estate as if
he had died intestate."
21. In re Horst, 264 N.Y. 236, 190 N.E. 475 (1934).
22. 248 S.W.2d 327 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
23. Marshall v. Marshall, 25 Tenn. App. 309, 156 S.W.2d 449 (M.S. 1941).
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was right in holding that the contract reserved to the father the right
to disinherit his son, a lingering doubt remains. If draftsmen would
only struggle to make their meanings crystal clear, much litigation
would be avoided.
Interpretation. Careless and inept draftsmanship continues to ac-
count for a very large segment of litigation throughout the United
States. The law schools have yet to train students in the skills of
draftsmanship, in the precise use of words so essential to the practice
of law. The busy lawyer too often accepts the written expression of
his client's wishes in the words drafted by the client. There is no sub-
stitute for time and thought in the preparation of documents if the
draftsman is to envisage and cover the many and varied circumstances
against which his words may have to be read. In Cansler v. Unknown
Heirs of Chairs,24 the testatrix, without close kin, wanted to leave her
money to those who cared for her and gave her companionship and
the benefits of family life during her last illness. She left certain real
estate in trust to her executor to convey it "to the person or persons
who shall stay with me in my home continuously during my last ill-
ness." The determination of such person or persons was to be made
by her executor. 25 The will was drawn in August of 1949, and for about
six weeks thereafter a Mrs. Browder resided in her home and at-
tended her as a nurse. When Mrs. Browder could no longer remain
with her, testatrix moved to the home of her long-time friends, Mr.
and Mrs. Beck, where she remained until her death. Mrs. Browder
came closer than did the Becks to meeting the literal terms of the gift,
but Mr. and Mrs. Beck met the spirit of the bequest. The Court held
that the words in my home were not to receive a literal construction,
that what the testatrix intended by the expression was to reward those
who gave her companionship and attention during her last illness,
whether in her home or elsewhere, and that the Becks satisfied this
test.
The Court was less liberal in Long v. Wood,26 because the problem
raised the use of technical language and the words actually indicated
that the draftsman understood the technical aspects of the bequest.
Yet the writer is not satisfied that the result reached was what the
testator intended. In that case, testator gave his wife a life estate in
his property. At her death, the property was to be held in trust for
their two sons. Each child was to receive "in equal portion the income
of said fund until such time [as the trustees] shall consider him capable
of controlling absolute ownership of his share of estate, when it shall
24. 250 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
25. The Court held that the bequest did not fail for indefiniteness, since the
power was circumscribed by a readily ascertainable objective standard. Id. at
581.
26. 253 S.W.2d 731 (Tenn. 1952).
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be given to him outright. Should either child die before end -of the
Trust his share shall continue in trust for his legitimate heirs. Should
he be without legitimate issue then his share reverts to his brother.
Should both children die before their mother she may dispose of
estate as she sees fit." What the draftsman neglected to eover was
the situation where both children predeceased the wife, one or both
leaving issue. The two sons did in fact predecease their mother, dne
of them leaving issue. May she now "dispose of the estate as she sees
fit?" The Court held that she could.
In my classes in draftsmanship, I find that the most common error
which the students make in their efforts to draft clauses disposing of
remainder-interests under any one of the several contingencies that
may arise is to cover all but one possible event. That would seem to
be what happened here. Why should the testator have wanted to take
care of a deceased son's child if, but only if, the other son happened
to survive his mother? Why should he want to disinherit a grandson
because his only uncle happened to die before his grandmother (tes-
tator's wife)? The Court, however, pointed out that the draftsman
knew to anticipate deaths in other than their natural order and that
he knew how to provide for such occurrences. In each of two quoted
sentences, the testator mentioned legitimate heirs or issue. "Can the
Court assume that in the writing of the very next sentence the testator
forgot to mention the issue or heirs to which he had expressly twice re-
ferred in the two immediately preceding sentences?"
27
Tax Clause in Will. In American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Mander,28
the question was whether the estate taxes should be charged against
specific assets bequeathed to a charitable foundation or against the
residue, which went to the testator's relatives. If the taxes were pay-
able out of the assets that were earmarked for charity, they would be
greater by more than $6,000,000 than if payable from the shares going
to the residuary legatees. The reason for this is that the money used
to pay death taxes is itself subject to tax. Thus if a $4,000,000 estate
is given half to a son and half to Vanderbilt with the requirement thlat
the share allocable to Vanderbilt shall be used to pay all taxes and
administration expenses, Vanderbilt will in fact receive nothing, since
the estate tax on a $4,000,000 estate is approximately $2,000,000. But
if the taxes are to be borne by the half going to the son, Vanderbilt
will get its $2,000,000, and the son will get slightly in excess of
$1,000,000.
The testator in the Mander case had created a charitable foundation
during his life. By his will he left specific assets, amounting in value to
approximately two-thirds of his estate, to this foundation. The resid-
27. Id. at 733.
28. 253 S.W.2d 994 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
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uary estate he left to named beneficiaries. Paragraph 1 of the will
directed the executor to pay all debts, including funeral expenses and
expenses of administration. Paragraph 6 directed "my executors ...
to . . . charge against my residuary estate any and all . . . Death
Taxes. .. 2" About a year later, testator executed a codicil, directing
that "expenses of administration . . . be paid from the fund be-
queathed . . . [to charity] so that the bequest . . . [to charity] . . .
shall consist of the assets described in said Section Four (4) diminished
by such part thereof as may be necessary to pay said administration
expenses."
Did he have a change of heart? Did he want to throw all the costs
of dying against the charitable gift so that his individual donees would
receive an amount which he could now calculate with some degree of
certainty, or did he want only partially to relieve them of these costs.
While estate taxes are generally not regarded as part of the costs of
administration,29 they, like administration expenses, were at common
law payable from the residue, in the absence of a contrary provision
in the will.30 This rule served well enough before taxes began to sky-
rocket. But, since the thirties, taxes in many cases have wiped out
the entire residue. Statutes have now been enacted in most jurisdic-
tions to modify this rule by requiring that taxes be apportioned among
the legatees unless the will provides otherwise. 31
The decision in this case followed the traditional view that estate
taxes are not part of the "administration expenses" and, therefore, are
chargeable against the residue under the will. But it seems possible
that the testator intended to revoke this provision by the codicil.
Today, a large and constantly growing number of testators are so
planning their estates that their families will receive a fixed dollar
amount without regard to the uncertainty of taxes, and, after fulfilling
their family obligations, they give the excess to charity in fulfillment
of their community obligations. The technique is to charge against the
charitable bequests administration expenses, including taxes. While
the Court in the instant case seems to have reached a result which most
probably reflects this testator's wishes, the shifting by the codicil of
the administration expenses to the charity leaves a lingering doubt
that he may have wanted to assure his individual beneficiaries gifts
that would not vary with our ever-changing death costs, of which
taxes are the major item. Modern-day testators think of death taxes
as just as much a part of the expense of transmitting property as
executors' fees, attorneys' fees and other costs of administering their
estates.
The case, because of the large amount involved, shows graphically
29. 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 13.54 (1942).
30. Ibid.
31. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8350.7-8350.9 (Williams Supp. 1952).
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the need for a tax clause and the care with which it should be drafted,
if a testator's desires are not to be thwarted.
TRUSTS
Stock Dividends. The most important decision of the year in the
trust field was Nashville Trust Co. v. Tyne.32 The problem involved
was the proper apportionment of stock dividends between the life
tenants and the remaindermen. Should a stock dividend be treated as
corpus or income?
It is clear everywhere that stock dividends paid in stock of other
than the declaring corporation constitute income. Thus, if General
Motors were to distribute shares of X stock to its shareholders, no one
would dispute that the X shares are to be treated as income. Here,
the dividend is being paid in property rather than cash. But the courts
have had trouble with dividends paid in the stock of the declaring com-
pany. Such dividends effect changes in the capital structure; they do
not result in the transfer of property from a corporation to its stock-
holders. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court of the United
States has held that any attempt to tax them as income is unconstitu-
tional.33 After the dividend, the stockholder's interest is no different
than it was before. His capital investment is merely measured by a
different unit; the change is formal, not substantial. But there may be
other considerations present in determining whether a stock dividend
should be treated as distributable income to the life tenant rather than
as corpus to be preserved for the remainderman. Not all stock divi-
dends are prompted by recapitalization plans. A growing number of
corporations follow a consistent policy of declaring periodic stock
dividends in lieu of regular cash dividends.
This problem has produced considerable litigation in the courts.
Their holdings are not harmonious. There are, in fact, three divergent
rules, known as the Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Kentucky rules.34
Under the Massachusetts rule, all stock dividends are treated as corpus.
Under the Kentucky rule, all such dividends are income. The Penn-
sylvania rule requires an apportionment. It gives to the life tenant
whatever portion of the dividend is attributable to earnings of the
corporation subsequent to the creation of the trust; the balance is
treated as corpus.
In the Tyne case, the Supreme Court awarded the entire stock divi-
dend to the life tenants. As the entire dividend was attributable to
earnings arising after the creation of the trust, the Court left open the
32. 250 S.W.2d 937 (Tenn. 1952), 22 TENN. L. REv. 975 (1953), 6 VAND. L. REV.
416 (1953)..
33. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206-9, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521
(1919); cf. Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 63 Sup. Ct. 420, 87 L. Ed. 571
(1943) ; see 6 VAND. L. REV. 936 (1953).
34. 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 236.3, 236.7 (1939).
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question whether Tennessee would follow the Kentucky or the Penn-
sylvania rule.
None of the rules are free from criticism. Trustees prefer a rule of
thumb in the interest of certainty of administration. Either the Massa-
chusetts or the Kentucky rule assures this. And probably because in
the past most stock dividends had more of the aspects of recapitaliza-
tions than of regular dividend distributions, the overwhelming weight
of authority follows the Massachusetts rule.35 But for tax reasons in-
vestors are becoming increasingly interested in corporations that pay
regular stock dividends. These so-called "growth stocks" are very
attractive, since they represent a medium for converting what would
be ordinary income into capital gain. But in jurisdictions following
the Massachusetts rule, it is doubtful if a prudent trustee in fairness
to the life tenant may invest in such stocks.36 While the Pennsylvania
rule would seem to be fairer, it has been criticized as administratively
unworkable or at least undesirable.3
7
Will and trust draftsmen have long solved the problem by providing
in the instrument itself that the determination of whether a stock divi-
dend shall be treated as income or corpus, or partly as income and
partly as corpus, shall be made by the trustee in the exercise of his
discretion or (alternatively) that all such dividends shall be treated
as capital except that those paid in lieu of periodic cash dividends or
recoupment of dividends defaulted or accumulated while the shares
are held in the trust shall be treated as income. Because of the almost
universal practice of draftsmen to include such provisions in trust
instruments, this problem is much less common than it once was. It
would nevertheless seem desirable (particularly as the Court left open
whether the Pennsylvania or Kentucky rule would be adopted by it)
to enact legislation to take care of the cases where no provision is
made in the instrument.
It is suggested that the legislation should (1) take the form of the
customary provision,38 found in carefully drawn trusts, that such divi-
dends shall be capital except to the extent that they are paid in lieu of
regular cash dividends or recoupment of dividends defaulted or ac-
cumulated while the shares were held in trust or (2) provide that the
determination to apportion between or to wholly allocate a stock divi-
dend to income or corpus be left to the discretion of the trustee. Either
of these solutions would reflect the considered opinions of the bar
throughout the country. This seems preferable to the proposal sub-
35. Id. at § 236.3.
36. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Tucker, 52 R.I. 277, 160 Atl. 405 (1932).
37. 2 ScoTT, TRuSTS § 236.3 (1939).
38. TWEED AND PARSONS, LIFETIME AND TESTAMENTARY ESTATE PLANNING 90
(Rev. ed. 1951).
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mitted to the 1953 Tennessee General Assembly39 (which failed to get
out of committee) to adopt the provision of the Uniform Principal and
Income Act, which provides "all dividends of shares of a corporation
forming part of the trust corpus which are payable in the shares of the
corporation shall be deemed principal."40
LEGISLATION
The 1953 session of the Tennessee General Assembly enacted two im-
portant pieces of trust legislation. Trustees were authorized (1) to in-
vest in common trust funds41 and (2) to hold security investments in
the names of nominees.42
Common Trust Funds. To an increasingly large extent, trust insti-
tutions have found it desirable to maintain common trust funds in
which to invest the funds of small estates. The obvious advantage to
the beneficiaries is the wide diversification (and hence reduction of
risk of loss) that the common fund makes possible. The cost of ad-
ministering small trusts is also considerably diminished. This legisla-
tion may be confidently expected to very substantially increase the
number of small trusts in Tennessee. A survey of trust funds through-
out the country in 1950 showed that the 107 funds then in operation
had an aggregate principal value of $634,315,895 and were administered
for about 75,000 beneficiaries in about 37,000 individual accounts.43
Nominees. When securities are registered in the name of a trustee
as such, the corporation registering the transfer of the securities may
be liable for participation in a breach of trust, because it is chargeable
with notice of the trust instrument.44 Thus it must study the trust
instrument and determine the authority of the trustee. Under the new
law, the trustee, subject to certain safeguards, may hold trust securities
in the name of a third person without disclosing the trust ownership.
The purpose of nominee ownership is, of course, to avoid the necessity
of an examination of the trust instrument by the corporation or its
transfer agent with the resulting delay. The speed-up in transfer-
ability may be very important in a rapidly fluctuating market.
39. Report of the Tennessee Board of Commissioners for the Promotion of
Uniformity of Legislation in the United States to the 1953 Session of the
General Assembly of Tennessee in Accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. § 1015
(Williams 1934).
40. UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 5, 9A U.L.A. 233 (1951).
41. UNIFoMV COMMON TRUST FUND ACT, Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 148.
42. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 165.
43. 90 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 100 (1951).
44. SCOTT, CASES ON TRUSTS 447 (3d ed. 1952).
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